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Complicity, complexity, historicism:  
problems of postcolonial sociology. 
 
 
Gregor McLennan, University of Bristol, UK 
 
 
Introduction 
The exchange between Herb Lewis and George Steinmetz1 in relation to the latter’s edited 
collection Sociology & Empire poses central issues about the significance of postcoloniality 
for sociology, and arguably central issues for postcolonial studies more widely.  The question 
of sociology’s residual ‘complicity’ with empire is at the heart of the debate.  This is highly 
charged terrain, because whilst complicity can be made to signal, as Steinmetz maintains, a 
fairly neutral sense of ‘entanglement’, for most people it cannot fail to carry an 
unmistakeably negative connotation: that sociology and sociologists have not only been 
involved in empire, they have been co-responsible for the historical and political ills visited 
upon ‘the rest’ by ‘the West’.  
In this contribution, I work through interpretations of complicity to see whether the 
‘neutral’ and ‘accusative’ interpretations can be squared. It turns out that in order to take this 
forward, serious problems in socio-historical theorizing need to be identified more explicitly 
than has been the case in the discussion around Sociology & Empire, or indeed in most forms 
of current postcolonial discourse. On our way to that conclusion, and bringing into play other 
texts on postcolonial sociology, I float three notional options on the discipline’s presumed 
complicity. The first is unequivocally condemnatory: born of the expansionary 
Enlightenment, installed within the Western academy during the high tide of European 
imperialism, and reluctant even now to acknowledge the provincial nature of its purported 
universalism, sociology is compromised to the core as part of the dominant regime of truth. A 
second position is more hesitant, in fact it seems to represent a kind of programmatic 
ambivalence. Here, sociology’s compromised profile is exposed and regretted, but overall it 
is viewed as a more interestingly contradictory amalgam than straight rejectionism implies. 
The third possibility holds that the discursive tensions within sociology are better grasped in 
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terms of multi-stranded complexity than as Janus-faced dualism. In that case we might push 
forward with a sociology confidently engaged, both reflexively and positively, in the analysis 
of colonial and postcolonial societies. This is the approach that Steinmetz is recommending.  
But further articulation is needed for this third option to stand out, and my way of 
doing this brings to the fore aspects of complexity theory. Complexity theory is frequently 
regarded as this era’s best way of grasping the explanatory commonalities of the natural and 
human sciences without obliterating their significant differences. This is because complexity 
discourse seems to offer a satisfactory layering and blending of different levels of generality 
and specificity in the workings of open, dynamic natural or social configurations; and 
because it accepts that different types of causal mechanism together constitute patterned 
interaction. To be clear, I am only touching lightly on this philosophical current for present 
purposes, though I think it still helps to unearth what is at stake in considerations of 
postcolonial sociology.2 I argue that reference to complexity discourse does buttress 
Steinmetz’s perspective by comparison with the other options considered – until, that is, a 
crucial question arises. Is the methodological historicism advocated by Steinmetz ultimately 
of the systems-theoretical type that scientific complexity discourse fosters; or is it, by 
contrast, more in tune with what seems like a new wave of particularism and empiricism? 
From that second angle, situated complexity should not be ratcheted up into suspect and 
clunky systems-talk at all. This overarching methodological problem holds considerable 
significance for the style and substance of postcolonial enquiry across the range of 
disciplines. 
 
The two complicities 
Let us note that in their exchange, Lewis and Steinmetz ostensibly agree that with regard to 
its assumed complicity with empire, ‘blanket condemnations’ of sociology are inappropriate. 
They also concur that many of the individual chapters in Sociology & Empire do not 
exemplify the condemnatory option. That said, Lewis thinks that a simplistic moralism 
orchestrates the volume, whereas Steinmetz vigorously denies this. Can both be right, and 
wrong (in various ways)? I think so. For example, Lewis’s talk of the editor and his ‘group’, 
machinating to expose past intellectual accomplices of Western oppression, is way off the 
mark, as Steinmetz shows. More generally, Lewis is insufficiently alert to the fact that the 
comparative gains of this volume over other landmark recent collections on postcolonial 
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sociology are in good part due to the substantive and theoretical interventions of Steinmetz 
himself. On the other hand, it seems like wishful thinking when Steinmetz pledges that the 
only place in this book that the word ‘complicity’ appears is on the back cover. Both 
Kurasawa (p. 194) and Connell (p. 493) deploy the term in a relatively unmediated sense, and 
the ‘question of complicity’ is pivotal to theirs and to other chapters too. That concern with 
complicity, moreover, also drives the major (related) challenge to the assumption that radical 
critique, in postcolonial context, remains essentially ‘secular’.3 So this matter cannot easily 
be side-lined in terms of where critical theory should be headed.  
The logic of the complicity-complexity connection is worth dwelling upon. Steinmetz 
notes some of the legal connotations of complicity, but more can be said. In law, complicity 
is paradigmatically about aiding or abetting the commission of a crime, and generally a 
matter of accountability for harm done. This can quickly be broken down further, because 
there can be inadvertent complicity, complicity by omission or neglect, complicity under 
duress, and complicity through perceived necessity. Already, here, complicity covers many 
degrees of causal contribution, happenstance involvement, and responsibility. Moreover, 
whether maliciously intended or not, and although the causal contribution may be weak, the 
assist just as much as the primary commission can be considered to constitute the event in 
question. The very specification of a legal offence – a riot, say, or a ‘terrorist’ attack, or any 
kind of past collective wrong – may be impossible without complicity taking central stage. 
Ethical considerations of a necessarily speculative sort then come into play: who could have 
reasonably acted or thought differently, in the circumstances? Could one have been expected 
then, from where we sit now, to have had some kind of ‘knowledge’ of the future, in terms of 
anticipating the nature and extent of damage done? Such complications lead the scholar from 
whom I have derived these points to conclude that for all its technicalities in law, the question 
of complicity ‘goes to the heart of our attempts to live an honest moral life in an imperfect 
world’.4  
When the imperfect world in question stretches over different epochs and geo-
political contexts, where the harm involved is amorphously socio-cultural as well as 
episodically criminal, and if the whole process is co-constituted by direct and indirect action, 
culpable and inadvertent intentionality, the question of complicity becomes simultaneously 
more pressing and distinctly agonistic. This is because the issue is not only about finding 
degrees of causal contribution, rationalization, and resistance. It is also about opening up for 
debate the nature and depth of the ‘harm’ itself; about the difficulty of allocating different 
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aspects of the harms to the past, present or future; and about assessing the ways in which the 
harms, over time, become bound up with knowledges, technologies, and cultural reference 
points that cease to be the instrumentalities of the perpetrators alone. All this, I guess, 
approximates to the question of complicity in the domain of empire, from the point of view of 
a politics of the present. 
And in that regard, complicity turns out not to be the notional opposite of complexity, 
but part of it.  Lewis wants to say, in that case, that we should altogether ditch the question of 
complicity qua guilt or responsibility for imperialism; Steinmetz advises that we need to 
proceed to examine the work and lives of sociological individuals and groups on a case by 
case, criterion by criterion, context by context basis. He also understands that while there 
may be no transparent relationship between personal and systemic effects and perspectives, 
the links between these two dimensions (agentive and systemic) can never be severed 
entirely, because they are co-constitutive of the phenomenon.   
This is a longstanding sociological proposition, of course, but it has received fresh 
legitimation from complexity theory. This is because systemic coherence displays, indeed is 
defined by, emergence: the ‘higher level’ shape and trajectory of the whole depends upon 
innumerable ‘lower level’ inputs and interactions, but develops structural properties that go 
beyond the inputs of any group of causal determinants. On top of that, in complex life, 
whether natural or social, we are never talking about just one system only, but a range of co-
present and mutually influencing large-scale phenomena. Interestingly, some complexity 
scientists use the very term ‘complicity’ to capture precisely this context of compound 
structural interaction. Thus, according to one influential statement:  
Complicity is the tendency of interacting systems to coevolve in a manner that 
changes both, leading to a growth of complexity from simple beginnings – complexity 
that is unpredictable in detail, but whose general course is comprehensible and 
foreseeable.5 
 
Applying this to our immediate concerns, the development of Western global hegemony can 
be depicted as a matter of complicity in these systemic, relatively impersonal terms: over 
centuries of compound interaction, involving different social forms and forces, both within 
and also between ‘the West’ and ‘the rest’, cultural benchmarks and power sources develop, 
consolidate and change in various ways.  But this does not mean that complicities in the more 
customary human meaning have been bleached out of the picture, because we are still talking 
about ‘structures in dominance’. Accordingly, at every stage the emergent characteristics of 
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the system are fuelled by myriad, differentially weighted individual and collective 
contributions (thoughts, deeds, and social relationships). Now this way of presenting the two 
senses of complicity, and how they operate together, is highly general and as such will not 
resolve the normative questions of who and what to blame for colonialism-imperialism, if 
that is what we seek to do. But it does, I think, spell out the underlying logic of the ‘third’ 
analytical option for postcolonial sociology that George Steinmetz is proposing. 
 
Discourse and power revisited 
How might these considerations of complexity guide further our sense of the options facing 
postcolonial sociology? Thinking for a moment of examples from outside the recent batch of 
texts on the subject, the late Stuart Hall’s 1992 essay on the ‘West and the Rest’ offers one 
kind of complexity-attuned critical perspective. Hall took his readers through the ways in 
which this powerful imaginary was sponsored in the European Enlightenment, and he 
emphasised how it continued to be ‘still at work’ within contemporary sociological 
understandings.6 In particular, and along with many others, Hall associated two of 
sociology’s much-qualified yet still-extant assumptions – that ‘modernity’ represents, at least 
comparatively speaking, an ‘advanced’ form of social organization, and that modernity took 
off definitively in the societies of Europe/the West/the North – with the logic of the ‘four 
stages’ theory of human history first fully adumbrated by people like Adam Smith and John 
Millar.7 For Hall, the analytical schemas of the stadial philosophers came directly out of the 
colonial regime of their times, when due to the consolidated process of ‘discovery’, conquest, 
trade and exploitation, the whole phased development of humanity from hunter-gatherers to 
‘polished’ commercial businessmen, appeared contemporaneously spread before their very 
eyes. And the notion of progress that formed an integral part of this emerging universalist 
social scientific discourse was normatively grounded in the inevitably prejudiced, frequently 
vicious, contrast between ‘rude’ and ‘refined’ societies, between ‘ignoble savages’ and the 
‘cultivated’ metropolitan class. 
Put this way, Hall’s essay – building on Said’s Orientalism of course8 – appears to set 
a firmly corrective-dismissive tone for postcolonial retrospects on sociology. Julian Go’s 
account of the ‘imperial unconscious’ underlying the founding of American sociology in the 
Steinmetz volume and Steven Seidman’s review of the ‘colonial unconscious of classical 
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sociology’ in Go’s 2013 collection Postcolonial Sociology appear to fall squarely into that 
mould.9 However, a closer reading of Hall reveals a more nuanced reading. 
First, Hall constructs his account in a broadly Foucauldian way in order to illuminate 
the connections between discourse and power. The West-Rest imaginary, in that sense, is not 
to be addressed directly in classical ideology-critique terms, but rather as a matter of 
excavating an underlying ‘regime of truth’. Now Hall knows very well – as Said did – that 
the Foucauldian matrix triggers almost unresolvable conundrums about the relationship 
between the material context/consequences of theoretical perspectives and their ideational 
content, and about whether the rightness or wrongness of the ideas themselves enters the 
Foucauldian picture at all. For those reasons, Hall states, the discourse/power framework is 
being used heuristically. A second point is that, for Hall and many other postcolonialists, 
putting ‘modernity’ into question as structured by, and in various ways serving, empire, does 
not mean disowning cultural modernity/modernities, or saying that history can and should be 
somehow reversed, or insisting that modernity did not emerge as some kind of qualitatively 
new ‘stage’ out of pre-existing and very different social formations, modes of production, and 
cultural imaginaries. Neither is he implying that ‘rise of the west’ stories that highlight 
‘endogenous’ or internal developmental processes are always invalid as such, only that 
teleological, necessitarian, and uni-dimensional accounts are. The point then becomes that 
whatever acceptable factors ‘internal’ to the European context are duly given an explanatory 
role, corresponding and at times overwhelming ‘external’ determinations – those to do 
primarily with physical encounter, conquest and cultural imposition – also have to feature 
prominently.10 
Third, Hall highlights the dangers of reproducing the West-Rest binary by thinking of 
western modernity and its scholars as culturally homogeneous and as uniformly regressive in 
political-historical terms. He counters the oft-heard but entirely superficial slogan that binary 
thinking itself is some kind of special cultural effect of modernity, because he knows that all 
cultural systems are coordinated by binaries of one sort or another. What Hall is doing, rather, 
is seeking to combine a sense of the systemic, integrating nature of colonial-imperial 
hegemony with an appreciation that the way that has been established, motivated, 
operationalized, and contested are, to an extent, ‘open’ questions.  
We can underline this by noting that Hall drew considerably on R. L. Meek’s Social 
Science and the Ignoble Savage. That 1975 work argued that although the stadial theory was 
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shared by a whole generation of scholars, and incorporated ‘supremacist’ attitudes, Millar’s 
version especially was subtle and powerful, providing substantive and methodological 
insights of enduring value for any historical sociology. Meek rebuffs the accusations of 
‘Eurocentrism!’ made by a number of anthropologists and historians in the 1950s and 1960s – 
so let us note in passing that these debates have been around for some time – by showing that 
his favoured theorists were acutely aware of the downsides of commercial modernity; were 
careful to avoid mechanical and ‘inevitabilist’ applications of the stadial typology; and had 
considerable respect for the non-modern modes of life they were analysing. Above all, they 
were announcing the kind of contextualist and social frame of understanding that remains 
decisive in the battle against claims that differences between peoples can be explained in 
terms of natural inequalities. To claim, therefore, as some postcolonial critics do, that proto-
sociological theorizing of the stadial type rationalized the West’s sense of racial superiority, 
is mistaken. Rather, it made the sociological critique of racism possible.11  
 
Sociology and postcolonialism: programmatic ambivalence? 
In the light of the above, it might seem that a certain kind of principled ambivalence is the 
appropriate attitude to strike when thinking about the history and merits of sociology in the 
context of empire. However, though good for political dialogue and personal reflexivity, 
ambivalence does not easily make for coherent social theorizing, partly because, typically, 
one side of the ostensible dichotomy takes priority over the other. We can see this in the 
manifesto-like statements fronting two books that Sociology & Empire builds upon.  
In setting out an agenda for Decolonizing European Sociology (2010), Manuela 
Boatca and Sergio Costa provide a neat pairing of headings. They first ask ‘why postcolonial 
sociology?’ followed by ‘why postcolonial sociology?’ Indicatively, however, whilst the first 
question is given extensive treatment both in their essay and across their collection, little is 
said about why the third word matters in their goal of ‘postcolonially sensitive sociology’. 
Thus, ‘postcolonial theories are aimed straight at the heart of sociology’s central 
terminology’ because the latter’s ‘prescriptive and ahistorical universals’ correspond to ‘no 
independent, objective social reality’. Sociology, on this basis, merely ‘suppresses’ colonial 
difference and dynamics, and intrinsically harbours ‘strategies of exclusion’.  
Despite adhering to these unequivocal propositions, the authors in question then 
declare that they do not hold that sociology’s faults are ‘irreparable’. Thus, its ‘constructivist 
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conception of culture’ can be praised, and it is affirmed that postcolonial studies ‘contain a 
clear sociological scope’, because they ‘treat differences in the context of societal structures’. 
Nevertheless, because the failures of sociology have been presented as so grave, this 
endorsement comes across very much as an afterthought.12 
 
Julian Go’s prefatory analysis in Postcolonial Sociology (2013) outlines three main 
waves of postcolonial thought, in the course of which humanities subjects like history and 
literary studies are said to have been far more receptive to postcolonial themes than ever-
resistant sociology. Go never precisely states why sociology should be so stubborn, but we 
deduce that it is due to the reproduction of the ‘imperial gaze’ by the founders of the 
discipline that Go invokes early on. He proceeds to advise that sociologists have much to 
learn from postcolonial theory that is not available within, indeed runs against, the standard 
sociological repertoire, pointing out that if Marxist-influenced theories of development and 
the world system have been ‘sociology’s best answer’ to the postcolonial boom in the 
humanities, those paradigms have waned along with the consistent charges of economic 
reductionism (correctly) made against them. Postcolonial theory, on the other hand, has 
produced rich, pluralistic, multidimensional analyses in which the ‘cultural, psychological, 
discursive, epistemic, representational or textual dimensions’ of empire-related issues are 
given due consideration. Sociology’s deficiencies are compounded by its difficulty in even 
addressing questions of empire (as opposed to nation), and its lack of postcolonial attention to 
subaltern voices and agency. All in all, then, sociology would appear to be completely 
disabled by its entrapment within the ‘metropolitan standpoint’.  
At this point, however, Go distances himself somewhat from the ‘strand’ of 
postcolonial critique that directly equates sociology with positivism, and positivism with the 
epistemic and political ‘violence’ of the imperial standpoint. He asks: what if sociology is not 
completely or inherently positivistic? What if the postcolonial critique itself relies on ‘a 
minimal epistemological positivism’ such that we can claim to demonstrably know 
sociology’s metrocentricity and its reflection of Northern interests? And what if sociological 
knowledge – like other parts of science – has validity notwithstanding its Eurocentric origins? 
In that light, Go recommends that we don’t have to ‘uncritically accept sociology or reject it 
entirely’; rather we should acknowledge its limitations and reflexively ‘push ahead’ with new 
methods and concepts ‘so as to meet the postcolonial critique’. This is well said, but once 
again there is a hefty imbalance in the expression of ambivalence. The probing questions 
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come too late in the day, and had they really carried conviction, the framing of the 
relationship between sociology and postcolonial thought would have had to be significantly 
different right from the start.13 
Sociology & Empire takes up the task of sociological ‘pushing ahead’, but not 
exclusively in order ‘to meet the postcolonial critique’, and in a way that is ‘positive’ as well 
as ‘reflexive’. It is not so readily assumed that postcolonial thought is profoundly out of kilter 
with critical historical sociology. Its governing sense of ambivalence, and the positioning of 
individual sociologists and different national sociologies in the context of empire are 
therefore more endorsing. So Lewis cannot be right in regarding Sociology & Empire as 
driven by a stilted concern with complicity. Yet, complicity does take its place within the 
book, prominently so in being allocated the authoritative concluding statement, by Raewyn 
Connell. Thus, Connell quickly notes aspects of the new forays into sociology of empire, 
before returning emphatically to the irretrievable fact of empire in sociology. Plying that 
now-familiar track, Connell asserts amongst other things that ‘[t]he comparative method that 
Durkheim saw as the heart of sociology is exactly the colonizer’s gaze on the colonized 
within the epistemology of empire’ (p. 490). 
But such formulations are very strained. The ‘exactly’ in Connell’s assertion, for one 
thing, cannot be exactly right. Nor can Durkheim’s or any other sociologist’s version of ‘the 
comparative method’, as such, merely be the vehicle for epistemological and worse types of 
violence against the colonized, as such. Connell’s central trope, moreover, ‘the point of view 
of the Metropole’ just crudely reverses the West/Rest binary. Even the notion of the power-
laden colonizing ‘gaze’, lazily culled from Foucault and solemnly repeated, meme-like, by so 
many authors in these volumes, is more an all-purpose metaphor than a precise explanatory 
concept. Postcolonial copyright on the gaze notion is assumed to hold because – harking back 
to Hall and Meek – the theorists of European modernity felt they had some kind of master 
map under view, according to which the necessary history and improvement of the world 
could be plotted spatially in terms of advanced and primitive peoples currently existing. But 
the degree to which this is accurate, and what exactly one can conclude from it, is far from 
clear, not something to be pre-empted through mechanical association. Alan Macfarlane 
(2000) for example – no linear evolutionist – absolves Montesquieu, Smith and Tocqueville 
from the charge, while Fuyuki Kurasawa’s 2004 book on The Ethnological Imagination, 
referred to by Lewis, finds the gaze of Rousseau, Marx, Durkheim, and Weber postcolonially 
enabling as well as, inevitably, constrained and constraining in various ways.14 And as we 
10 
 
have seen, Meek made the case for withdrawing the guillotine from Scottish proto-
sociologists like Millar, whose sense of ‘universalist’ theory explicitly incorporated rather 
than over-ran the specificities of times, places, environments, modes of socio-economic life 
and cultural ‘inclinations’. Millar’s thought was formed when Glasgow was booming on the 
profits of the Atlantic tobacco trade; wealthy merchants attended his lectures thus 
contributing to his academic salary; and the social circles in which his ideas circulated were 
thoroughly bourgeois, male, and white. So Millar’s thinking must be profoundly colonialist – 
right? Wrong, or let’s just say debatable.15 
Let me try to crystallise what I find problematical – I do not say groundless – in the 
postcolonial critique (of sociology) in both the condemnatory and reluctantly ambivalent 
modes. 
1. There is a constant temptation to commit the ‘genetic fallacy’: because sociology was 
born in Europe and exposited by metropolitans, therefore its principles and 
theorizations serve only the ‘imperial standpoint’. This form of reasoning is fallacious 
because it entails the bizarre conclusion that strictly nothing in the realm of ideas can 
transcend their formative context and ideological use. (Ironically, the authority of the 
claim itself is also thereby undermined.)  
2. It follows that the reluctance in these volumes openly to credit sociological thinking 
with context-breaking qualities and insights is unwarranted. Partly this is due to the 
regrettable tendency amongst some postcolonial commentators to cast suspicion on 
generalisation as such, figuring abstraction to be some kind of colonial gambit or 
form of epistemic violence, despite the fact that without the power of generalization 
and an aspiration to universalistic sense-making, postcolonial analysis would be 
impossible. Partly, it is due to a rather strange envy of other disciplines. It does not 
occur to Julian Go, for example, that if, compared with sociology, humanities subjects 
are more enthusiastic about postcolonial themes, this is part of a profound longer-term 
‘sociologization’ of those disciplines, given their traditionally much stronger 
commitment to abstract universal values and their higher symbolic status amongst 
metropolitan cultural elites.  
3. The tendency to present postcolonial thought itself as uniform and coherent, such that 
the learning process between it and sociology is thought to run entirely in one 
direction, is distorted. It overlooks postcolonialism’s necessary sociological 
dimension, being massively dependent upon large scale social-structural 
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generalization and ideology-critique; and it diminishes the huge amount of internal 
dispute that has characterised the field of postcolonial studies since its inception. Go 
attributes pluralistic multi-dimensionality to postcolonial thought at the expense of 
poor old economistic Marxism. Yet this plays down Marxism’s always-considerable 
influence on people like Said, Spivak and Hall, and it forgets the fact that precisely 
the same complaint against Marxism has been levelled by generations of eminently 
pluralistic western sociologists. In any case, the idea that multiple analytical 
dimensions require to be somehow pulled together is by no means the same as 
synthetically theorizing them. That is an enormously difficult task, not least because 
strong and interesting theories generally nominate a preferred explanatory key, to 
more or less ‘reductionist’ effect. 
 
Towards complexity 
Sociology & Empire is far less prone to those problematic tendencies.16 It enhances 
postcolonial sociological complexity firstly by moving away from the tendency to 
anthropomorphize Sociology, as though it were some kind of singular purposive agent that 
could be blamed, praised, cajoled, or just laid to rest. It’s interesting to note here that this 
exaggerated sense of disciplinary imperative has no equivalent in the humanities or natural 
sciences. Sociology does foster a progressivist sensibility widely shared amongst its 
practitioners, and this is one of its strengths, but it shouldn’t be overdone. Steinmetz provides 
a necessary corrective by encouraging talk of sociologists rather than Sociology in the 
context of empire, and by making encroachments on their scientific ‘autonomy’ his 
benchmark criterion. This is quite a controversial move, when so much faux-philosophical 
theorizing leads many critical scholars today to refuse any distinction whatsoever between 
science/scholarship and normativity. The increasingly tedious charge of ‘positivism!’ is 
therefore already on its way. But whilst, of course, sociologists are ever-embroiled in the 
politics of the present and the ideological conditions and consequences of their analyses, 
intellectual distance still has to be levered, and an aspiration to objectivity motivated, 
otherwise it all reduces to ‘whose side are you on?’ (which is a vital question for sociologists 
as people).  
Secondly, the book is marked by a greater sense of pluralism than its predecessors, 
achieved just by inclusively setting the more accusative contributions alongside exploratory 
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and positive ones, especially in the ‘National Sociological Fields’ section. The sense of fair 
and robust debate is thereby enhanced, which speaks to that sociological sensibility of 
progressive dialogue across difference.17 So I don’t favour Lewis’s recommendation of high-
handed disciplinary disentanglement. For example, while I have some difficulties with 
Connell’s contentions in general, and with her modular engagements with particular 
‘Southern’ thinkers,18 her injunctions that sociologists really must so engage, and that they 
must take the size and cultural significance of the land of the world more fully into their 
global schemas, are salutary indeed, and could only have come out of a legitimate, fully 
‘entangled’, concern about disciplinary complicity.  
Third, pluralistic debate does not equate to complexity theory per se, but there are 
anticipations of the latter too. Epistemologically, Steinmetz proposes in his reply to Lewis 
that we view (social) science as a developing hybrid amalgam of three relatively autonomous 
processes: the internal dynamics of the field (which include symbolic power dynamics), the 
external social contexts of science, and ‘irreducible creative acts’. Methodologically, in the 
opening pages of his introduction to the book, Steinmetz states that ‘sociological resources’ 
for research on empire must include the latter’s forms, developmental trajectories, 
determinants and effects. In relation to the determinants and effects, the point is to establish 
‘conjunctural, contingent, multicausal patterns of causality’, comprising not only social and 
economic strands, but ideological, linguistic, cultural and psychic dimensions too. 
Substantively, the goal is to identify the specific ‘emergent properties’ that empire exhibits 
over and above the level of states and nations. This actually amounts to a very considerable 
agenda, but in principle it is one that seems strongly guided by the tenets of complexity 
thinking. 
Something of this complexity agenda is instantiated in the ‘Current Sociological 
Theories’ part. For example, Krishan Kumar’s chapter shows that the traditional opposition 
between nation state and empire may be deceptive. Empires can generate state-like cultural 
mechanisms to secure integration, whilst in a sense – it comes as a mild shock – the major 
‘Westphalian’ nations have always been actual or quasi-empires in formation or 
disintegration, rather than stable ‘stand-alone’ social totalities. A similar suggestion had been 
made previously by Michael Mann, whose chapter Lewis deems journalistic and self-
regarding.  This is a serious misjudgement. Mann’s work has been at the very centre of 
theoretical historical sociology in multidimensional style. His grasp of the different but 
combined sources of social power enabled him to support a broadly ‘internalist’ account of 
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the endogenous (but also happenstance, concatenated) conditions leading to the ‘rise of the 
West’, whilst also recognizing the undeniably ‘predatory’ character of its ‘externalist’, 
expansionary moment.19 Mann takes things further here (pp. 213-216) by providing a fertile 
encapsulation of the meaning of empire – ‘a centralized, hierarchical system of rule acquired 
and maintained by coercion through which a core dominates peripheries, serves as the 
intermediary for their main interactions, and channels resources from and between the 
peripheries’. He then offers a five-fold typology to chart historically the different phases and 
regimes of empire: direct, indirect, informal, economic, and hegemonic. It is the latter that 
currently straddles the world, Mann asserts, characterised by a ‘diffuse collective domination’ 
by Northern institutions and actors. The absence of direct coercion and coordination here 
intimates that Mann is offering a version of the Smithian ‘hidden hand’ or Hayekian 
‘spontaneous order’ – sometimes referred to as ‘conservative’ versions of social complexity 
theory. But Mann has newly injected Gramsci into his scenario, so it is still very much a 
structure in dominance. And if the totality lacks a grand design or singular meaning, its 
overall viability and direction remain the product of multiple group interests, conscious 
actions, open and latent contestation.  
Finally in this context, Lewis cannot see why Bergeson’s discussion of China’s 
‘surgical imperialism’ in Africa should be in this book at all, given critical sociology’s 
obsession with Occidentalism. But as Steinmetz insists, the book is not so obsessed. 
Moreover, while Bereson’s surgical metaphor and other aspects of his argument are far from 
definitive, his attempt to exemplify ways in which empire might develop after the West, and 
through the combined resources of alternative modernities, is surely both interesting and 
necessary. It suggests, again, that a sociological account of history featuring various phases 
and logics of social organization is not (necessarily) a Eurocentric pursuit.  
 
Questions of historicism 
Lewis doubts the theoretical coherence and depth of Part II of Sociology & Empire, and 
cannot see how the seven informative Part III studies of the situated politics of colonial 
settings add up to a ‘new approach’ to imperialism. This is true, they don’t. Yet the avoidance 
of unifying conceptual punchlines, and an associated shift towards greater historical 
specificity represents a definite theoretical strategy in its own right – a pluralistic, 
deflationary one. Thus, the forms of complicity of intellectual and administrative colonial 
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strata, when looked at on the ground, turn out to be various and partial. They also include 
subaltern resistance, as illustrated by Daniel Goh’s theoretically strenuous account of the 
‘Contradictory Rationalities of State Formation in British Malaya and the American 
Philippines’. The ‘historical’ chapters, then, support the editor’s conviction, after Weber, that 
‘social events and objects are almost always conjuncturally overdetermined’ (p. 12). In that 
sense they bring to a fitting close this substantial contribution to sociology in the broadest 
sense. 
Let me close by pondering the implications of this new historicism. One question is 
whether it is as fully in line with complexity theory as I have, for argument’s sake, been 
suggesting.  One of the strongest appeals of complexity discourse, in its systems-theoretical 
variants, is that as well as postulating an inadequate simplicity this side of complexity, so to 
speak, it also promises the satisfaction of higher-level clarity the other side of complexity. 
That is why most complexity scientists are driven not by postmodern visions of chaos, but the 
prospect of unifying ‘laws of complexity’.  But Steinmetz’s idea of historicism – a term, of 
course, open to almost diametrically opposed meanings – seems more ‘Rankean’ than 
‘Popperian’. In other words it veers more towards recognising the utter particularity of events 
in time/context than to finding their deeper significance by reference to a normatively-
inspired perspective on human history as a whole. In that light, sociological involvements in 
empire, and even the nature and direction of empire itself, become definitively circumstantial, 
affording little scope for integrative theorization, not least because so many causal and 
motivational factors seem to demand full accreditation (social, economic, psychic, linguistic, 
cultural, personal, creative, and so on).  
We need to note here that major challenges have lately been levelled against whatever 
remains of sociology’s initial quest for overarching patterns and drivers. One form of critique 
due to Bruno Latour and others is that only vacuous or erroneous propositions result 
whenever particular phenomena are ‘explained’ in terms of sociology’s ostensible main 
object, ‘the social’. This is because the latter is not the source or cause or essence of 
anything; at best it is the outcome of what should really be grabbing our attention: those 
limited sequences of networks and assemblages in which people interact with multifarious 
things and other non-humans. Accordingly, Latourians urge the abandonment of explanation 
altogether in favour of a new descriptivism.20  
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Relatedly, social theory’s residual ‘epochalism’  and ‘culturology’ have come under 
fire – its constant apparent requirement that all manner of social dimensions, events, ideas, 
tastes and behaviour be packaged up into homologous affinities and historical blocs. And 
energising that kind of project is said to involve a hubristic political romanticism: the 
compulsion critical scholars somehow feel to always be speaking for society, berating others 
about its special crises and evils, and pre-emptively installing their preferred notion of radical 
progress.21 Latour is increasingly invoked by cultural radicals, but his cutting comment that 
postcolonial theory now stands as the latest epochal romanticism in that unacceptable vein 
should give great pause for thought in that regard.22 This is because despite their differences, 
totalizing perspectives like Marxism, radical cultural studies, and postcolonial ideology-
critique are indeed similarly epochalist and culturological. Perhaps sociology is too, in a 
mild-mannered way. In response, today’s new sceptics – typically leaning on Foucault, 
Deleuze or Latour – favour an ethically- rather than politically-orientated observational 
empiricism.  
It would be interesting to learn how Steinmetz thinks his historicism connects with 
this intriguing set of issues, urgent for sociological theory and postcolonial studies alike.23 
For the moment, his solution is broadly ‘Weberian’, though those who see Weber’s sociology 
as forever invalidated by his racism may not approve. The thought is that if sociology needs 
to be careful about untrammelled generalisation, it can at least generate perspicacious models 
to cut into the dense situational material in order to gain analytical and causal traction. Thus, 
Steinmetz’s chapter provides a helpful set of ‘working definitions’ of the notions of empire, 
imperialism, colonialism, and the state, and fills them out by reference to pertinent socio-
historical scenarios. And Mann, we have seen, delineates a sequence of forms of empire, 
explicitly tagging them as ideal types. But does this all amount, finally, to a qualified 
epochalism, or is it more a case of sophisticated pragmatic empiricism?24  
The long-standing philosophical (and also political) issue here is this. Weber held, in 
the neo-Kantian way, that while ideal types were both necessary as a matter of 
epistemological management, the manifold of social experience that they cut into – that 
teeming, endless mass of irreducible particulars – has no knowable core structure. Our ideal 
types are dependent upon the way in which we animate and accentuate social reality, and we 
make what we can of that scientifically, which is to say pragmatically. Now some 
sociologists and postcolonialists alike will find that rationale attractive – that ultimately, all 
scholarship is the product of the ineliminable clash of values and interests. But other 
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sociologists and postcolonialists are more ontologically realist. They think that the truth or 
otherwise of our historical perspective matters, not least because politics without truth 
becomes essentially whimsical or manipulative. In that case, ideal types are necessary, but 
only as first approximations towards a deeper grasp and a bigger picture, one in which the 
rise and fall of real social orders over time is something about which we can have secure 
knowledge, all the better to inform a better future. Such concerns go back a long way, yet 
remain highly active, not least in the ongoing ‘rise of the west’ debates.25 Are these meta-
theoretical questions any longer pertinent in identifying and justifying a postcolonially-
attuned sociology? And if so, does Steinmetz’s historicism offer a satisfactory resolution? 
 
Notes 
 
1 Herb S. Lewis, ‘Disentangling Disciplines’; George Steinmetz, ‘Defensive Anthropology’, 
Postcolonial Studies, this issue. 
 
2 Whilst complexity theory holds considerable promise for the social sciences, its adoption is by no 
means unproblematical. See Gregor McLennan, Sociological Cultural Studies: Reflexivity and 
Positivity in the Human Sciences, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, Chapter 8, ‘The Turn to 
Complexity’. 
 
3 It pervades, for example, the notable collection by Wendy Brown, Talal Asad, Judith Butler, and 
Saba Mahmood, Is Critique Secular? Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009. 
 
4 James G. Stewart, ‘Complicity’, in M.D. Dubber and T. Hornle (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Criminal 
Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming, 2014. 
 
5 Jack Cohen and Ian Stewart, The Collapse of Chaos, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995, p.3. 
 
6 Stuart Hall, ‘The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power’, in S. Hall and B. Gieben (eds.), 
Formations of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992, p. 315. 
 
7 Essentially, the four historical-societal stages proposed (both empirically and theoretically) were 
hunter-gathering, pastoralism, settled agriculture, and commercial-mercantilism. The social types and 
stages of ‘progress’ were therefore defined in terms of different modes of subsistence, corresponding 
to which were certain socio-cultural practices, forms of belief, and civilizational qualities. 
 
8 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978. 
 
9 Steven Seidman, ‘The Colonial Unconscious of Classical Sociology’, in J. Go (ed.) Postcolonial 
Sociology (Political Power and Social Theory Vol. 24), Bingley: Emerald, 2013; Julian Go, 
‘Sociology’s Imperial Unconscious: the Emergence of American Sociology in the Context of Empire’, 
in G. Steinmetz (ed.), Sociology & Empire: The Imperial Entanglements of a Discipline, 
Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2014. 
 
10 Hall, ‘The West and the Rest’, p. 317. 
 
                                                          
17 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11 Ronald L. Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1975, pp. 235-43. Disappointingly, Steinmetz neglects to mention the Scots in his genealogy of 
‘proto-sociologists’. 
 
12 Manuela Boatca and Sergio Costa, ‘Postcolonial Sociology: A Research Agenda’, in E. G. 
Rodriguez, M. Boatca, and S. Costa (eds.), Decolonizing European Sociology: Transdisciplinary 
Approaches, Farnham: Ashgate, 2010, pp. 14-17, 23, 26-7.  
 
13 Julian Go, ‘Introduction: Entangling Postcoloniality and Sociological Thought’, in J. Go (ed.) 
Postcolonial Sociology, pp. 4, 6-9, 18-21. 
 
14 Alan Macfarlane, The Riddle of the Modern World, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000; Fuyuki 
Kurasawa, The Ethnological Imagination: A Cross-cultural Critique of Modernity, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. As Lewis points out, Kurasawa’s chapter in Steinmetz backs off from 
the more sociologically affirmative conclusions of his earlier book, for reasons that escape me. 
 
15 Millar was an early abolitionist, and he felt that the degradation of women was one of the retrograde 
features of Western commercial society. In both respects he still remained, of course, a man of his 
times. See W.C. Lehmann, John Millar of Glasgow, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960, 
which includes parts of Millar’s principal treatise The Origin of Ranks, first published in 1771. 
 
16 Let me clarify that this is a relative, comparative judgement, because the earlier volumes were not 
inhospitable to debate. They included against-the-grain chapters by myself, for example, and an 
absorbing paper by Boaventura de Sousa Santos in Decolonizing European Sociology – ‘From the 
Postmodern to the Postcolonial – and Beyond Both’ – that might lead us to reconsider whether 
complexity really is as different from ambivalence as I have been intimating. 
 
17 The strongest ‘positive’ account of sociology’s engagement with coloniality is now to be found in 
George Steinmetz’s ‘British Sociology in the Metropole and the Colonies, 1940s-1960s’, in J. 
Holmwood and J. Scott (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Sociology in Britain, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2014. There, at one go, Steinmetz quells two of Lewis’s complaints: complicity obsession and the 
neglect of British sociology. 
 
18 See my ‘Postcolonial Critique: the Necessity of Sociology’ in Postcolonial Sociology for comments 
on Connell’s handling of non-Western thinkers in her book Southern Theory, Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2007. In Sociology & Empire, Connell extends her approach to Sun Yat-sen and Jomo 
Kenyatta, but the presentation of these canny, North-knowing, deliberately strategizing political 
intellectuals as straightforwardly particularist cultural voices of the South strikes me as sociologically 
and historically naïve. 
 
19 For the shorthand version see Mann, ‘Predation and production in European imperialism’, in S. 
Malesevic and M. Haugaard (eds.) Ernest Gellner & Contemporary Social Thought, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
20 See Patrick Joyce (ed.) The Social in Question: New Bearings in History and the Social Sciences, 
London: Routledge, 2002, which includes a chapter by Latour.  
 
21 For one statement of anti-epochalism see Thomas Osborne, Nicolas Rose, and Mike Savage, 
‘Reinscribing British Sociology’, Sociological Review 56 (4): 519–34.  
 
22 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to ANT, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005, p. 187.  
 
18 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
23 In ‘Transdisciplinarity as a Nonimperial Encounter: For an Open Sociology’, thesis eleven 91, 
2007: 48-65, Steinmetz seeks to erase any recalcitrant differences between sociology, history, and 
other social and humanities disciplines. But in doing so he re-endorses – whether on behalf of 
sociology itself or the new larger collective – sociology’s traditional object, the social.  
 
24 It can be noted here that Mann’s anti-evolutionist, multifactorial perspective in The Sources of 
Social Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986 & 1993) did posit one quasi-
evolutionary selector mechanism, namely the capacity for ‘organizational outflanking’. By contrast, 
his Incoherent Empire, London: Verso, 2003, though excellent and hard-hitting, seems content to be 
largely descriptive. 
 
25 See for example the discussion of methodological ‘accidentalism’ in the exchanges around Joseph 
M. Bryant, ‘The west and the rest revisited: debating capitalist origins, European colonialism, and the 
advent of modernity’, Canadian Journal of Sociology 31(4), 2006: 403-44. 
